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Looking for a foundation

Descartes wanted to find a method that would allow him to be certain about things. He wanted to know if it was possible to sort out what was true and what was false. He lived in a time where science was actually testing what was true and so Medieval dogma was about to be reviewed. He wanted to find an Archimedean point, or lever – which is a hypothetical vantage point from which an observer can objectively perceive the subject of inquiry, with a view of totality. The expression comes from Archimedes, who supposedly claimed that he could lift the Earth off its foundation if he were given a place to stand, one solid point, and a long enough lever. So Descartes was after the ‘unmoveable point’ that would allow him to find certainty.

Descartes is a substance dualist. This means he believed there are two kinds of ‘stuff’ in the universe. There is matter and mind. Matter is extension and mind/thought is cognitive in primary qualities respectively.

He casts doubt on all senses. He even goes so far as to say he can’t tell whether he is dreaming or in wakefullness.

[…]in thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now dream. 

What he does conclude however, is that we can experience appearances – whether or not they are real or fake, they do have form.

[…]although these general things, to wit, [a body], eyes, a head, hands, and such like, may be imaginary, we are bound at the same time to confess that there are at least some otherobjects yet more simple and more universal, which are real and true; and of these just in the same way as with certain real colours, all these images of things which dwell in our thoughts, whether true and real or false and fantastic, are formed.

He says all the other sciences such as geometry and arithmentic are always very general and simple, they do not ask whether something exists at all. It doesn’t matter whether he is awake or asleep, 2+3 will always equal 5. 

He says he is sure of a God creator, but can’t be sure whether or not this creator has made him in such a way that he could be being decieved, there may not be any such earth or heavens, no extended body. The only way he thinks he can be sure is that God is Good and would never decieve him on these matters. He does however consider that there may be a God who is tricking him.

I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity

Descartes is in danger of solipsism here, or the belief that only he exists (or at least he can only be sure that he himself exists) and nothing else.

In finding whether he can be certain, he is now haunted by doubts.

I suppose, then, that all the things that I see are false; I persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my fallacious memory represents to me. I consider that I possess no senses; I imagine that body, figure, extension, movement and place are but the fictions of my mind. What, then, can be esteemed as true? Perhaps nothing at all, unless that there is nothing in the world that is certain

He asks whether or not it is neccessary to include this God problem. He asks whether he is at least something that is capable of producing these reflections of the mind without a God experiencing through him. He concludes that he definitely exists, whether or not he is being decieved. It is here that he decalres his famous dictum:

Cogito ergo sum. I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it.

I think, therefore, I am. This is the birth of ‘I’ philosophy. He’s not sure exactly what he is, however, only that through a qualitative statement can he be sure he exists and nothing more.

He considers himself to have a body, he refuses to say he is ‘man – the reasonable animal’as that would require him looking into what animal is and so he observes his reflections as they appear to him. He has sensations, which require a body, but this walking and nourishing body would feel the same in a dream and if he was being deceived by an all powerful being. All he can say is – he is a thing which thinks.

He plays with a piece of wax and says he can conclude that vision and intuition allow him to infer the existence of extensions. He cannot percieve it without a human mind. 

[…]what I have here remarked of wax may be applied to all other things which are external to me [and which are met with outside of me]. And further, if the [notion or] perception of wax has seemed to me clearer and more distinct, not only after the sight or the touch, but also after many other causes have rendered it quite manifest to me

Ideas, images and modes

He’s reached the limit of what he can know, but it’s rather a big limit. He can only be sure he exists, not be sure what he is. He can be sure that an object (extention) cannot be percieved without a human mind. He has to find a way to be sure that there are two kinds of stuff in the universe, that which he percieves through cognition, intution and understanding and the stuff outside of his mind, the extensions.

And, certainly, since I have no reason to believe that there is a God who is a deceiver,and as I have not yet satisfied myself that there is a God at all, the reason for doubt which depends on this opinion alone is very slight, and so to speak metaphysical. But in order to be able altogether to remove it, I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything.

He divides his thoughts up into two different kinds:

[list=1]
[*]Ideas – the images of the things
[*]Passions – desires, will, fear and other judgements
[/list]If we consider the ideas in themselves, they can’t be false, but the passions may be, he could desire evil things for example, he may desire things which have never existed, but it is not less true that he desires them.

But the principal error and the commonest which we may meet with in them, consists in my judging that the ideas which are in me are similar or conformable to the things which are outside me; for without doubt if I considered the ideas only as certain modes of my thoughts, without trying to relate them to anything beyond, they could scarcely give me material for error.

Some of these ideas appears to be innate and some from other people. Sensations lead him to judge that there are things outside of him that cause the sensation. He hasn’t discovered their true origin yet however. He finds the passions to be the most misleading and although the objects that appear to be outside of him do not depend on his will all of the time, he can’t be sure either way.

He then divides ideas into two categories: adventitious ideas, or happening as a result of an external factor or chance rather than design or inherent nature. The Sun appears to be extremely small for example. Then there are non-innate ideas, from astronomical reasonings that say the Sun is several times larger than the earth.

Representationism

If you take ideas as certain modes of thought, there is no difference or inequality, they all proceed from him in the same manner as discussed. If however, we consider them as images, that one thing represents another – it is clear they are different.

He then thinks of reality in terms of cause and effect. He thinks that something cannot come from nothing. Something which is perfect or great, cannot proceed from something imperfect or lesser, which is to say that causes must be greater than their effects. 

[…]if the objective reality of any one of my ideas is of such a nature as clearly to make me recognize that it is not in me either formally or eminently, and that consequently I cannot myself be the cause of it, it follows of necessity that I am not alone in the world, but that there is another being which exists, or which is the cause of this idea. On the other hand, had no such an idea existed in me, I should have had no sufficient argument to convince me of the existence of any being beyond myself; for I have made very careful investigation everywhere and up to the present time have been able to find no other ground.

There cannot be any ideas which donnot appear to represent some things, he concludes. 

Substance

Descartes percieves things like stones as being made of substance and he percieves himself to be a substance also. He is the thing which thinks and which does not extend. The stone is the thing which extends and does not think. The qualities are not things from him. 

The God bit

God to Descartes is an infinite, independent and immutable substance which cannot have proceeded from himself. From this he concludes that God must necessarily exist. The idea of God is entirely true. God cannot have proceeded from him as he is imperfect. 

He does contemplate as to whether there is something more to himself which he is not aware, that potentially the perfectness of God is in him, somehow. He sees no limit on the progression of his understanding and thinks it could possibly be that the Divine could be producing these ideas of perfection in him.

All that I thus require here is that I should interrogate myself, if I wish to know whether I possess a power which is capable of bringing it to pass that I who now am shall still be in the future; for since I am nothing but a thinking thing, or at least since thus far it is only this portion of myself which is precisely in question at present, if such a power did reside in me, I should certainly be conscious of it. But I am conscious of nothing of the kind, and by this I know clearly that I depend on some being different from myself.

On saying that causes must be greater than their effects, there is no way he exists and other things exist solely because of his parents, or some less than perfect being than God. The idea of a being as perfect as God is in him, it was put there when he was created. It is from this state of perfection and incorrputible nature of God, that he concludes he isn’t being deceived.

I recognize it to be impossible that He should ever deceive me; for in all fraud and deception some imperfection is to be found, and although it may appear that the power of deception is a mark of subtilty or power, yet the desire to deceive without doubt testifies to malice or feebleness, and accordingly cannot be found in God.

He believes that God may have given him the faculty to judge error, error is a defect not dependent on God. He’s not satisfied with this explanation however and says error is due to some lack of understanding on his part that he ought to possess. He concludes that God would not give him a faculty of imperfection like this sort. 

He puts it down to the fact that there is no way for him to comprehend God in the way that god can comprehend. The causes are transcendental to his own knowledge.

This concludes this thread on Descartes, I will start another one regarding essences of material things.

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